8,000 km Hybrid QKD–PQC Network Links Chicago, Amsterdam and the Basque Country
A consortium of research and technology organisations demonstrated an 8,000 km hybrid quantum-safe network spanning Chicago, Amsterdam and the Basque Country at SC26, the Supercomputing Conference 2026. The setup uses five quantum nodes across three locations: two at the Ciena and PCSS booths in Chicago (less than 1 km apart), one with SURF in Amsterdam, and two at University of the Basque Country (EHU) sites in Bilbao and Zamudio linked by a 25 km fibre. Quantum key distribution (QKD, which derives keys from the laws of quantum mechanics) runs only on those two short links using Luxquanta’s Nova lq systems, while post-quantum cryptography (PQC, software algorithms designed to resist quantum attack) carries the roughly 1,200 km Bilbao–Amsterdam and 7,000 km Amsterdam–Chicago hops using the NIST-standard ML-KEM. EHU’s QuLore framework orchestrates key selection and relays keys through intermediate sites, and Ciena’s optical platforms encrypt at line rate — 1.6 Tb/s (WL6e) in Chicago and 800 Gb/s (WL5e) in Bizkaia — with protection applied at the optical, IPsec tunnel and application layers. This was a conference demonstration announced in a press release, not a deployed or generally available service, and no independent performance measurement was reported.
Verified and unconfirmed
- Verified: The consortium (EHU, Luxquanta, Ciena, GÉANT, PCSS, RedIRIS and SURF) says it demonstrated the network at SC26 with five nodes in three locations, QKD on the two short links, ML-KEM-based PQC on the long links, and QuLore coordinating keys across Luxquanta, EHU vKMS and SURF eduKMS systems.
- Not yet confirmed: Key generation rates, latency, throughput under load, and any independent or peer-reviewed measurement of the setup; the press release also leaves out whether this becomes a production service and on what timeline.
Background
Quantum Key Distribution distributes encryption keys whose secrecy rests on physics rather than computational difficulty, but fiber-based QKD is generally limited to metropolitan distances of roughly 100 km, so long-haul links need post-quantum cryptography such as NIST’s ML-KEM. QuLore, the adaptive framework from EHU’s i2T research group described in an arXiv preprint, was built to choose between those methods per connection and coordinate separate key-management systems.
Why it matters
The demo targets sites that cannot put QKD hardware everywhere: because QuLore picks QKD or PQC per connection and stitches vendor key-management systems together through a common interface, operators can start quantum-safe migration on mixed infrastructure instead of waiting for end-to-end quantum hardware. The practical constraint is distance — fibre QKD is described as workable only to roughly 100 km, so any long-haul link today depends on ML-KEM and related PQC software, meaning the security of those hops rests on mathematics rather than physics.
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